JetBrains приостановит продажи в России и Белоруссии Статьи редакции
И прекратит все исследования и разработки в России.
- Глава JetBrains Максим Шафиров напомнил, что компания осуждает действия российского правительства и поддерживает украинцев, в том числе и своих сотрудников.
- JetBrains на неопределённый срок приостановит все продажи в России и Белоруссии, а также исследования и разработки в России.
- По словам Шафирова, решение приостановить работу в России было самым тяжёлым из всех, что когда-либо принимала компания. При этом JetBrains не может игнорировать ситуацию, так как это идёт вразрез с её ценностями.
- Многие сотрудники JetBrains в России уже покинули страну, сообщил Шафиров. Компания продолжит их поддерживать. Об увольнении речи не идёт.
- JetBrains в 2000 году создали Сергей Дмитриев, Валентин Кипятков и Евгений Беляев в Праге. Беляев в 2000-х вышел из состава учредителей. У неё есть офисы в Санкт-Петербурге, Бостоне, Мюнхене, Амстердаме и других городах.
- Компания разрабатывает собственный язык программирования Kotlin, который представила в 2011 году, а также инструменты для разработки на языках Java, Kotlin, C#, F#, C++, Ruby, Python, PHP, JavaScript.
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Фигня вопрос, все адекватные программеры уже рванули за бугор. А в классах информатики бабы нарожают новое поколение властелинов метавселенных. Или все таки стоит срочно остановить войну против Украины, которую по непонятной причине развязала РФ
"A second problem was the question of NATO expansion, this time to Ukraine and Georgia. There had been two waves of NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were offered membership in the second half of the 1990s, and then the Baltic states and four more Central European states a few years later. Yeltsin had gnashed his teeth over the first wave, but couldn’t do much about it. Putin offered little resistance to Baltic membership, amid all the other preoccupations of his first term. Georgia, and especially Ukraine, were different animals altogether. There could be no doubt that Putin would fight back hard against any steps in the direction of NATO membership for either state. In Washington, however, there was a kind of geopolitical and ideological inertia at work, with strong interest from Vice President Cheney and large parts of the interagency bureaucracy in a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia. Key European allies, in particular Germany and France, were dead set against offering it. They were disinclined to add to mounting friction between Moscow and the West—and unprepared to commit themselves formally and militarily to the defense of Tbilisi or Kyiv against the Russians. The Bush administration understood the objections, but still felt it could finesse the issue."
"THE BUCHAREST NATO summit (April 2008) had moments of high drama, with President Bush and Secretary Rice still hoping to find a way to produce MAP offers. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy were dug in firmly in opposition. In the end, the curious outcome was a public statement, issued on behalf of the alliance by Merkel and Rice, that “we agreed today that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”20 There was no mention of MAP, which disappointed Kyiv and Tbilisi, but what the statement lacked in practical import it seemed to more than make up for in clarity of direction. Putin came the next day for a charged NATO–Russia Council meeting, and vented his concerns forcefully. In many ways, Bucharest left us with the worst of both worlds—indulging the Ukrainians and Georgians in hopes of NATO membership on which we were unlikely to deliver, while reinforcing Putin’s sense that we were determined to pursue a course he saw as an existential threat."