Фигня вопрос, все адекватные программеры уже рванули за бугор. А в классах информатики бабы нарожают новое поколение властелинов метавселенных. Или все таки стоит срочно остановить войну против Украины, которую по непонятной причине развязала РФ
Я не говорю что то что российское правительство сейчас делает - всё правильно. Просто не надо односторонне выделять Россию как единственного или главного агрессора.
Войну никто не остановит. Путин уже вряд ли сможет, без достижений хоть какого то успеха. А западу война уж слишком выгодна - будут защищать свободу народов и демократию до последнего украинца и россиянина. Всё к этому давным давно шло и развязал её запад. Путин к сожалению лишь реагирует (а должен был бы агировать), так ещё и поздно реагирует.
То что этот конфликт разжёг запад и что это должно было рано или поздно произойти, говорят в том числе и профессора университетов Чикаго, Принстон и Нью Йорк, говорит Ноам Хомский - один из самых влиятельных если не самый влиятельный философ современности:
Блин, даже сегодняшний директор ЦРУ понял ещё в 90-ых что Россия Украину и Беларусь никому не отдаст, не зависимо от того кто сиди в Кремле:
Quotes from "The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal" by William J. Burns - current director of the CIA and former U.S. embassador to Russia (2005-2008):
As political officer in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in a report to Washington from December 1994 (after so called Budapest Blow Up): "Hostility to early NATO expansion, is almost universally felt across the domestic political spectrum here.”
As U.S. ambassador to Russia in an email to Condoliza Rize in February 2008, only 6 months before the Georgia war: "Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests. At this stage, a MAP offer would be seen not as a technical step along a long road toward membership, but as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze….It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. On Georgia, the combination of Kosovo independence and a MAP offer would likely lead to recognition of Abkhazia, however counterproductive that might be to Russia’s own long-term interests in the Caucasus. The prospects of subsequent Russian-Georgian armed conflict would be high."
Some other quotes: "No less a statesman than George Kennan, the architect of containment, called the (NATO) expansion decision (from 1996) “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post–Cold War era.”"
"Applied to this first wave of NATO expansion in Central Europe, Kennan’s comments struck me as a little hyperbolic. It damaged prospects for future relations with Russia, but not fatally. Where we made a serious strategic mistake—and where Kennan was prescient—was in later letting inertia drive us to push for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, despite Russia’s deep historical attachments to both states and even stronger protestations. That did indelible damage, and fed the appetite of a future Russian leadership for getting even."
"Putin gave us more credit than we deserved for careful plotting against Russian interests. For Putin, the September 2004 Beslan school siege was a turning point. The whole world saw live the massacre of more than three hundred teachers, staff, and students. Putin saw Bush’s response, which included warnings against overreaction and a dalliance with “moderate” Chechen elements to try to defuse tensions, as nothing short of a betrayal. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine that same year, and the Rose Revolution in Georgia before that, led Putin to conclude that the Americans were not only undercutting Russia’s interest in its sphere of influence, but might eventually aim the same kind of color revolution at his regime. These disappointments were piled on top of his anger over the Iraq War, a symbol of America’s predilection for unilateral action in a unipolar world, and President Bush’s second inaugural address and its “freedom agenda”—which Putin believed included Russia near the top of the administration’s “to-do” list. Democracy promotion, in his eyes, was a Trojan horse designed to further American geopolitical interests at Russia’s expense, and ultimately to erode his grip on power in Russia itself."
"A second problem was the question of NATO expansion, this time to Ukraine and Georgia. There had been two waves of NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were offered membership in the second half of the 1990s, and then the Baltic states and four more Central European states a few years later. Yeltsin had gnashed his teeth over the first wave, but couldn’t do much about it. Putin offered little resistance to Baltic membership, amid all the other preoccupations of his first term. Georgia, and especially Ukraine, were different animals altogether. There could be no doubt that Putin would fight back hard against any steps in the direction of NATO membership for either state. In Washington, however, there was a kind of geopolitical and ideological inertia at work, with strong interest from Vice President Cheney and large parts of the interagency bureaucracy in a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia. Key European allies, in particular Germany and France, were dead set against offering it. They were disinclined to add to mounting friction between Moscow and the West—and unprepared to commit themselves formally and militarily to the defense of Tbilisi or Kyiv against the Russians. The Bush administration understood the objections, but still felt it could finesse the issue."
"THE BUCHAREST NATO summit (April 2008) had moments of high drama, with President Bush and Secretary Rice still hoping to find a way to produce MAP offers. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy were dug in firmly in opposition. In the end, the curious outcome was a public statement, issued on behalf of the alliance by Merkel and Rice, that “we agreed today that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”20 There was no mention of MAP, which disappointed Kyiv and Tbilisi, but what the statement lacked in practical import it seemed to more than make up for in clarity of direction. Putin came the next day for a charged NATO–Russia Council meeting, and vented his concerns forcefully. In many ways, Bucharest left us with the worst of both worlds—indulging the Ukrainians and Georgians in hopes of NATO membership on which we were unlikely to deliver, while reinforcing Putin’s sense that we were determined to pursue a course he saw as an existential threat."
Фигня вопрос, все адекватные программеры уже рванули за бугор. А в классах информатики бабы нарожают новое поколение властелинов метавселенных. Или все таки стоит срочно остановить войну против Украины, которую по непонятной причине развязала РФ
Я не говорю что то что российское правительство сейчас делает - всё правильно. Просто не надо односторонне выделять Россию как единственного или главного агрессора.
Войну никто не остановит. Путин уже вряд ли сможет, без достижений хоть какого то успеха. А западу война уж слишком выгодна - будут защищать свободу народов и демократию до последнего украинца и россиянина. Всё к этому давным давно шло и развязал её запад. Путин к сожалению лишь реагирует (а должен был бы агировать), так ещё и поздно реагирует.
То что этот конфликт разжёг запад и что это должно было рано или поздно произойти, говорят в том числе и профессора университетов Чикаго, Принстон и Нью Йорк, говорит Ноам Хомский - один из самых влиятельных если не самый влиятельный философ современности:
Why is Ukraine the West's Fault? Featuring John Mearsheimer
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZVIaXFN2lU
Noam Chomsky on Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PX44pCgTss
Stephen F. Cohen: NATO expansion and Russia in 2010:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mciLyG9iexE
Блин, даже сегодняшний директор ЦРУ понял ещё в 90-ых что Россия Украину и Беларусь никому не отдаст, не зависимо от того кто сиди в Кремле:
Quotes from "The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal" by William J. Burns - current director of the CIA and former U.S. embassador to Russia (2005-2008):
As political officer in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in a report to Washington from December 1994 (after so called Budapest Blow Up):
"Hostility to early NATO expansion, is almost universally felt across the domestic political spectrum here.”
As U.S. ambassador to Russia in an email to Condoliza Rize in February 2008, only 6 months before the Georgia war:
"Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests. At this stage, a MAP offer would be seen not as a technical step along a long road toward membership, but as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze….It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. On Georgia, the combination of Kosovo independence and a MAP offer would likely lead to recognition of Abkhazia, however counterproductive that might be to Russia’s own long-term interests in the Caucasus. The prospects of subsequent Russian-Georgian armed conflict would be high."
Some other quotes:
"No less a statesman than George Kennan, the architect of containment, called the (NATO) expansion decision (from 1996) “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post–Cold War era.”"
"Applied to this first wave of NATO expansion in Central Europe, Kennan’s comments struck me as a little hyperbolic. It damaged prospects for future relations with Russia, but not fatally. Where we made a serious strategic mistake—and where Kennan was prescient—was in later letting inertia drive us to push for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, despite Russia’s deep historical attachments to both states and even stronger protestations. That did indelible damage, and fed the appetite of a future Russian leadership for getting even."
"Putin gave us more credit than we deserved for careful plotting against Russian interests. For Putin, the September 2004 Beslan school siege was a turning point. The whole world saw live the massacre of more than three hundred teachers, staff, and students. Putin saw Bush’s response, which included warnings against overreaction and a dalliance with “moderate” Chechen elements to try to defuse tensions, as nothing short of a betrayal. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine that same year, and the Rose Revolution in Georgia before that, led Putin to conclude that the Americans were not only undercutting Russia’s interest in its sphere of influence, but might eventually aim the same kind of color revolution at his regime. These disappointments were piled on top of his anger over the Iraq War, a symbol of America’s predilection for unilateral action in a unipolar world, and President Bush’s second inaugural address and its “freedom agenda”—which Putin believed included Russia near the top of the administration’s “to-do” list. Democracy promotion, in his eyes, was a Trojan horse designed to further American geopolitical interests at Russia’s expense, and ultimately to erode his grip on power in Russia itself."
Эка вы за всех адекватных расписались. Корона на голову не давит?
Может статистику к своему эпичному выводу приложите?
"A second problem was the question of NATO expansion, this time to Ukraine and Georgia. There had been two waves of NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were offered membership in the second half of the 1990s, and then the Baltic states and four more Central European states a few years later. Yeltsin had gnashed his teeth over the first wave, but couldn’t do much about it. Putin offered little resistance to Baltic membership, amid all the other preoccupations of his first term. Georgia, and especially Ukraine, were different animals altogether. There could be no doubt that Putin would fight back hard against any steps in the direction of NATO membership for either state. In Washington, however, there was a kind of geopolitical and ideological inertia at work, with strong interest from Vice President Cheney and large parts of the interagency bureaucracy in a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia. Key European allies, in particular Germany and France, were dead set against offering it. They were disinclined to add to mounting friction between Moscow and the West—and unprepared to commit themselves formally and militarily to the defense of Tbilisi or Kyiv against the Russians. The Bush administration understood the objections, but still felt it could finesse the issue."
"THE BUCHAREST NATO summit (April 2008) had moments of high drama, with President Bush and Secretary Rice still hoping to find a way to produce MAP offers. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy were dug in firmly in opposition. In the end, the curious outcome was a public statement, issued on behalf of the alliance by Merkel and Rice, that “we agreed today that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”20 There was no mention of MAP, which disappointed Kyiv and Tbilisi, but what the statement lacked in practical import it seemed to more than make up for in clarity of direction. Putin came the next day for a charged NATO–Russia Council meeting, and vented his concerns forcefully. In many ways, Bucharest left us with the worst of both worlds—indulging the Ukrainians and Georgians in hopes of NATO membership on which we were unlikely to deliver, while reinforcing Putin’s sense that we were determined to pursue a course he saw as an existential threat."
Тут Пу не читает